Usp 797 standards beyond use dating

§ 552a(g), two of which provide for injunctive relief – amendment lawsuits under (g)(1)(A) and access lawsuits under (g)(1)(B) – and two of which provide for compensatory relief in the form of monetary damages – damages lawsuits under (g)(1)(C) and (g)(1)(D). 1993) (“[T]he appropriate relief for a violation of Section 552a(e)(7) is found in the statute and allows for damages as well as amendment or expungement of the unlawful records. It has also been held that “[b]ecause the Privacy Act provides its own remedy for an agency’s improper refusal to process a proper request for information, [a plaintiff] is not entitled to mandamus relief.” , No. 1993) (recognizing applicability of subsection (e)(3) to IRS summons, and possibility “that a summons may be judicially enforceable yet not meet the disclosure requirements of the Privacy Act”). 29, 2001) (finding that common law obligations “not to disclose personal information” were “preempted by the Privacy Act”). Several courts of appeals have held that the Privacy Act’s remedies do preclude an action against individual employees for damages under the Constitution in a “, No. In an earlier decision, however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims were barred under the , the only other appellate decision on this issue. 31, 2011) (rejecting pro se plaintiff’s attempt “to correct his military records via a writ of mandamus” on ground that the Privacy Act “provides an adequate remedy for addressing plaintiff’s claims”); , No. June 6, 2003) (magistrate’s recommendation) (denying petition for writ of mandamus as “the Privacy Act establishes a procedure for filing suit in federal court if an agency refuses to comply with a request” and petitioner has not “shown, or attempted to show, that this procedure is inadequate to obtain the relief requested”), , 857 F.

§ 7852(e), which renders certain provisions of the Privacy Act inapplicable to the determination of the existence of tax-related liability”); , 842 F.

10, 1999) (holding Privacy Act notice requirements inapplicable to issuance of IRS summons, as 26 U.

§ 7852(e) “plainly states that the provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply, directly or indirectly, to assessing the possibility of a tax liability”); , No.

2003) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA for negligent disclosure of private information, as plaintiff could point to no “duty analogous to that created by the federal Privacy Act under local law to state a claim upon which relief [could] be granted”); , No.

It should also be noted that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the doctrine, which holds that “‘the [g]overnment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service’”, does not apply to the Privacy Act.

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July 20, 2005) (reasoning that “[b]ecause there is an adequate remedy available to plaintiff under the Privacy Act, he cannot resort to the APA for relief”); , 773 F.

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